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[So 1". No. 19646. In Bank. May 7, 1957.]

JAMES PARKS BRADLEY, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN
FRANCISCO, Respondent; FRANCES (BRADLEY)
LANE, Real Party in Interest.
[1] Husband and Wife-Property Settlement Agreementa-Interpretation.-The rule that in the absence of conflicting extrinsic
evidence as to the meaning of a property settlement agreement
the trial court's interpretation is not binding on the Supreme
Court does not apply where conflicting extrinsic evidence
was presented; under such circumstances, if there is evidence
which supports the trial court's interpretation, including inferences which it could reasonably draw, the court on appeal
will adhere to the interpretation placed by the trial court on
the writings and conduct of the parties.
[2] Appeal-Questions of Law a.nd Fa.ct-Documentary Evidence.
-Conflicting evidence will not be weighed by an appellate
eourt merely because it was presented by affidavit rather
than orally.
[8] Husband and Wife - Property Settlement Agreements-Interpretation.-The trial court's interpretation of a property
settlement agreement incorporated in a divorce decree, based
on its finding as to the intent of the parties, may be sufficiently
supported by affidavits of the former wife and of the attorney
who drafted the agreement, by the language of the agreement,
and by the former husband's own conduct.
[4] ld.-Property Settlement Agreements-Interpretation.-Where
a property settlement agreement incorporated in a divorce decree obligated the former husband to pay his former wife 40
per cent of his net income commencing on a certain date, he
could not successfully argue that since his remarriage his
present wife's community (one-half) interest in his earnings
must be deducted before computation of the 40 per cent payable to his former wife in view of the trial court's determination that such a deduction was .contrary to the intentions of
the parties at the time they executed their contract.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Husband and Wife, § 63; Am.Jur., Husband
and Wife, § 318 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3, 4] Husband and Wife, § 157(6) ;
[2} Appeal and Error, §1288; [5) Assilzoments. §20; [6,11,
17-19) Divorce, § 266; [7, 8J Divorc(', §~ 203, 216: [9) Constitutional Law, § 134; Husbimd and \vife, ~ 157; flO, 12] Divorce,
§ 260; [13] Divorc!', ~ 203; [14] Divorce, §§ 203,239; [15] Divorce,
§§ 249, 266; [16] Divorce, §§ 198, 260.
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[6] Assignments-Oontractual Interests-Salary and Wages.-A
property aettlement agreement incorporated in a divorce de.
eree obligating the former husband to pay his former wife
40 per cent of his net incoTlle from a certain date does not
constitute an assignment of wages or salary within Lab. Code,
§ aoo, limiting such assignments.
[6] Divorce-Enforcement of Awards-Contempt Proceeding&Punishment.-To imprison a former husband for failure to
make payments to his former wife under a property settlement
agreement obligating him to pay her 40 per cent of his net
income from a certain date would violate Const., art. I, § 15,
forbidding imprisonment for debt, where it had been specifically and finally determined, in an action between the parties,
that the payments involved were not "a severable provision for
alimony" and the agreement itself declared that it was "mtended • •• to refer only to property rights. . . ."
[7] Id.-Permanent Alimony-E:tfect of Agreement of Parties:
Modi1i.cation of Allowance.-A divorce decree is subject to
modification if the payments therein prescribed are for alimony, maintenance or support, though based on a property
settlement agreement, but not if such payments in themselves
are an integral part of an adjustment of property rights.
[8] Id.-Permanent AlimonY-E:tfect of Agreement of Parties:
Modi1i.cation of Allowance.-To the extent that monthly payments from a divorced husband to his former wife represent
a division of the community property itself, or constitute an
inseparable part of the consideration for a property settlement, they are not alimony and accordingly cannot be modified without changing the terms of the property settlement
agreement.
[9] Constitutional Law-Obligation of Contracts: Husband and
Wife-Property Settlement Agreements.-Neither the court
nor the Legislature may impair the obligation of a valid contract (Const., art. I, §§ 1, 16), and a court cannot lawfully
disregard the provisions of property settlement agreements or
deny to either party his rights thereunder.
[10] Divorce-Enforcement of Awards-Contempt Proceedings.Although every doubt should be resolved in favor of the liberty
of a citizen in the enforcement of the constitutional provision
tllat no person shall be imprisoned for debt, a court may nevertheless punish by imprisonment as a contempt the willful act
of- a spouse (or former spouse) who, having the ability and
opportunity to comply, deliberately refuses to obey a valid
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Assignments, § 23 et seq.; Am.Jur., Assignments, § 41 et seq.
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d, Arrest, § 11; Am.Jur., Arrest, § 54, Constitutional Law, § 327. ,,'
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order to pay alimony or an allowance for the BtIpport of the
other spouse (or former other spouse).
[11] ld.-Enforcement of Awards-Contempt Proceedings-Punishment.-The obligation to make payments of alimony or for
support of the other spouse (or forriler other spouse) is not
• "debt" within the meaning of the constitutional guaranty
against imprisonment for debt.
[12] ld. - Enforcement of Awards - Contempt Proceedings.Where the payments provided in a property settlement agreement constitute an adjustment of property interests rather
than alimony, support or maintenance, the more generally
prevailing rule is that decrees based thereon are not enforceable by contempt proceedings.
[18] ld.-Permanent Alimony-E:trect of Agreement of Parties.There may be situations in which the fact that a party has
agreed to pay some fixed or ascertainable amount as alimony
does not change or cODtrol the character of the obligation
sought to be enforced by the other; merely adding the consensual element of agreement to pay support does not obliterate an existing legal duty.
[14] ld.-Permanent Alimony-E:trect of Agreement.-In the absence of a waiver by the contracting spouses (expressly or by
necessary implication) of reciprocal rights to support other
than as provided in an agreement, either party may properly
seek to enforce in a divorce proceeding t.he obligations imposed
by law as incidents of the marriage; but where the parties
bargain with each other and agree that the terms of their contract shall thereupon and thenceforth grant, delimit and exclusively define their respective rights and obligations inter se,
then it is to the contract alone Ifnd to conventional civil proceedings for the enforcement of contract rights that they
must look for a remedy in the event of breach.
[15] ld.-Enforcement of Awards-Execution.-Inclusion in a
divorce jUdgment of a contract d('fining the respective rights
and obligations of the parties and excluding the concept of
alimony, support or maintenance may furnish a basis for
subsequent proceedings leading to issuance of a writ of execution, but cannot support a commitm(>nt ·to imprisonment for
failure to pay the judgment debt.
[16] ld.-Permanent Alimony-Object.-The term "alimony" does
not contemplate a settle111('nt of property interests or general
endowment of wealth; it has for its 801(' object the provision
of food, clothing, habitation and other n('c('ssaries for support, and it is to attain that ohject that the law imposes an
obligation which is regarded os something- oth('r than a debt
and which may be enforced by contempt proceedings UpOl,
appropriate showi,ng:
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[17] ld. - Enforcement of Awards - Oontempt Proceedinp Punishment.-Payments provided in a property settlement
agreement which are found to constitute an adjustment of
property interests rather than a severable provision for alimony should be held to fan within the constitutional proscription against imprisonment for debt; that is, if the obligation sought to be enforced is contractual and negotiated, as
distinguished from marital and imposed by law, even though
the contract relates to marriage obligations, the remedy must
be appropriate to the right asserted.
[18] ld.-Enforcement of Awa.rds-Oontempt ProceediDg&-Pnnishment.-Payments which fan into the category of law-imposed alimony or separate maintenance are based on the
statutory obligation of marital support, may be modified by
the court on a proper showing, ordinarily terminate with the
death of either party, and may properly be held not to constitute a "debt" within the meaning of the constitutional provision against imprisonment for debt; but no such case for
special exemption from the constitutional proscription can
be made where the payments represent the result of a bargain
negotiated by the parties in adjustment of their respective
interests. (Disapproving any implication to the contrary in
In re Rasmussen. 56 Cal.App. 368 [205 P. 72]; Ex Parte Weiler,
106 Cal.App. 485 [289 P. 645]; In re Lazar, 37 Cal.App.2d
327 [99 P.2d 342]; Seymour v. Seymour, IS Cal.App.2d 481
[64 P.2d 168]; Tripp v. Superior Court, 61 Cal.App. 64 [214
P. 252]; Shogren v. Superior Court, 93 Cal.App.2d 356, 364
[209 P.2d 108].)
[19] ld.-Enforcement of AWa.rds-Oontempt Proceedings-Punishment.-Where it has been finally determined that payments
to be made by a former husband to his former wife constitute
an inseverable part of an integrated adjustment of all property relations of the parties and not a severable provision
for alimony, the enforeement of such payments by contempt
proceedings is forbidden by the constitutional prohibition
against imprisonment for debt.

PROCEEDING in certiorari to review an order of the
Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco adjUdging petitioner to be in contempt. Order annulled.
Sullivan, Roche, Johnson & Farraher and James Farraher
for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Aaron N. CoheJ?. Sidney .Rudy and Ted Finman for Real
Party in Interest.

)
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SCHAUER, J.-A writ of certiorari was issued for the
purpose of reviewing an order of the superior court adjudging petitioner to be in contempt for refusing to make certain
payments to his former wife in accordance with the provisions
of their property settlement agreement and decree of divorce,
and directing that petitioner be imprisoned if he fails to comply with the court's order of payment. We have concluded
that although upon the record before us certain of petitioner's
f.. ontentions concerning interpretation of the provisions of the
property settlement agreement cannot be npheld, the order
directing his imprisonment for contempt upon his continued
failure to make payment should nevertheless be annulled as
ill violation of the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.)
In May, 1946, petitioner and his then wife, Frances, entered
into a property settlement agreement in which it is declared
that the parties owned both community and separate property,
and that they desired to agree to a separation and to settle
and determine their respective property rights and to provide
for the care and custody of their two minor children. The
agreement further declares that it "is intended as a Property
Settlement Agreement and to refer only to property rights.
" (Italics added.) The wife then instituted divorce
proceedings in the state of Nevada and in June, 1946, was
awarded a default divorce decree. Such decree by its terms
purports to order, among other things, that the written property settlement agreement between the parties dated May 14,
1946, is "hereby approved, ratified, confirmed and adopted
by the Court, and by reference made a part of this judgment
and decree . • . and each of the parties is hereby ordered to
carry out . . . each and all of the provisions by him or her
respectively required under the terms of said agreement ..• "
In September, 1952, the Nevada decree was established in
California as a decree of respondent superior court and such
California decree declares that" the parties are hereby ordered
to perform each and every obligation provided for by" the
Nevada decree. The California decree was affirmed on appeal
and became final in June, 1954. (See Lane v. Bradley (1954),
124 Cal.App.2d 661 [268 P.2d 1092].)
Under the property settlement agreement petitioner agreed,
among other things, to transfer certain real and personal
property to the wife, Frances, and to place in escrow as
security for performan5J-C of his obligations under the agree.CM-If
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ment certificates evidencing 40,000 shares of stock of Bradley
Mining Company, which stock is the property of petitioner;
under certain circumstances the stock could be sold with the
proceeds going to Frances. Petitioner further agreed to pay
to Frances "forty per cent. (40%) of his net income, commencing January 1st, 1947, exclusive of capital gains and
losses and distributions out of capital, but before deduction
of income taxes or charitable contributions, less one per cent.
(1%) of such net income for each 1,000 shares of said 40,000
shares of capital stock of Bradley Mining Company placed
in escrow which have been sold with the consent of First
Party [Frances] pursuant to . . . this contract."
Following the Nevada divorce, petitioner remarried in
March, 1948, and Frances remarried in October, 1948. For
four and one-half months after his remarriage petitioner computed his payments to Frances on the theory that half his
income belonged to his new wife as community property and
that therefore he was obligated to pay to Frances 40 per
cent of only his one-half of such community income. Petitioner was then advised by the attorney wko kad represented
botk parties in preparing tke property settlement agreement
that his apportionment theory was erroneous in that his
remarriage did not affect the computation of the amounts
accruing under his obligations to Frances. Thereafter, from
August, 1948, until he secured independent counsel in March,
1950, petitioner computed his payments to Frances without
any adjustment based on his remarriage. Then such inde- ,
pendent counsel advised petitioner that in his opinion peti- .
tioner was obligated to pay to Frances only 40 per cent of .
one-half of the community income of petitioner and his new
wife, and, further, that the words "net income" as used
in the property settlement agreement meant net income as
computed for income tax purposes (that is, gross income less
certain deductions not theretofore taken by petitioner in
computing his payments to Frances). Relying upon such
advice petitioner paid Frances only $1,800 during the year
1950. (The factual data used for computing such amount are
not shown in the present record.)
Thereafter, in April, 1951, petitioner consulted different
independent counsel and was advised that the remarriage of
Frances terminated petitioner's obligations to pay to her 40
per cent of his net income and that he had already overpaid
her under the terms of the property settlement agreement.
Petitioner therellpon ceased all such payments, and in June,

May 1957]

BRADLEY tI. SUPERIOR COURT

515

[48 C.2d 509: 310 P.2<I 634 J

)

1951, Frances commenced the action l by which the Nevada
divorce decree was established as a decree of the California
superior court. Petitioner defended the action on the ground
that the provision for payment to Frances of 40 per cent of
his net income was an alimony provision and therefore was
terminated by the remarriage of Frances. The trial court
made its findings and conclusions to the effect that petitioner's
obligation to make payments to Frances was a continuing one
which "has not terminated or been diminished by reason of
the remarriage of plaintiff [Frances] or for any other reason. "
Judgment was entered awarding Frances recovery of the sums
accrued to that date on the theory indicated in the above
mentioned findings and conclusions, and establishing the
Nevada decree in this state. As hereinabove mentioned, the
judgment, which became final in June, 1954, also ordered the
parties "to perform each and every obligation provided for
by" the Nevada decree.
In February, 1955, Frances instituted the present contempt
proceeding, asserting that since June 16, 1951, petitioner has
wilfully failed and refused to pay to her 40 per cent of his
net income, except for a payment of $15,000 on account, and
that as of February, 1955, he owed her an additional
$37,969.30. Petitioner defended on the ground that the term
"net income" should be construed 80 as to permit him to
make various deductions and that one-half his salary (i.e.,
one-half of the community income of himself and his present
wife) should be excluded on the theory that it was not his
income but belonged to such wife.
The evidence which was presented to the trial court consisted in part of the judgment roll in the California action.
In addition testimony was submitted in the form of affidavits.
The court found that in using the term "net income" the
parties had not intended that petitioner be allowed any of
the deductions for which he contended or that a half of the
community income be excluded in Case he remarried. Judgment was rendered accordingly, and petitioner was held in
contempt and ordered imprisoned unless he made installment
payments to Frances pursuant to a schedule set forth in
the order of contempt and commitment. This petition for
review followed.
[1] Petitioner, contending that the trial court erred in
its finding as to the meaning of the term "net income," cites
'Hereinafter tor brenty referred to as the Ca.li!ornia aetioa.
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(Messenger v. M('ss('nger (1956), 46 Ca1.2d 619, 626 [4]

[297 P.2d 988) and quotes the rule that "In the absence of i
(·onflicting extrinsic evidence as to the meaning of the agreement, the trial court '8 interpretation of it is not binding on
this court." But where, as here, conflicting extrinsic evidence was prrsented, the quoted rule does not apply. On
the contrary, under such circumstances if there is evidence
which supports the trial court's interpretation, including inferellces which it could reasonably draw, the court on appeal
will adhere to the interpretation placed by the trial court on
the writings and conduct of the parties. (Quader-Kino A_ O.
v. Nebcnzal (1950), 35 Ca1.2d 287, 294 [1] [217 P.2d 650].
and cases cited therein; Abbott v. Hauschild (1952), 113 Cal.
App.2d 383, 387 [2] f248 P.2d 41].) [2] Petitioner's suggestion. that because in the present case the evidence was presented by affidavit rather than orally it will be weighed by
an appellate court, is without merit. (See Riley v. Turpin
(1956),47 Ca1.2d 152, 157 [6] [301 P.2d 834].)
[3] Following the rule stated, it appears that the evidence
supports the trial court's int.erpretation of the agreement here
involved, based upon its finding as to the intent of the parties.
Such supporting evidence consists of affidavits of Frances
and of the attorney who drafted the agreement,. the language
of the agreement itself, and petitioner's own conduct. Inasmuch as petitioner argues the weight of the evidence rather
than seriously urging that there is no evidence whatsoever
supporting the trial court's construction of the agreement, no
useful purpose would be served by here relating the evidence
in detaiJ.% [4] Petitioner's argument that since his remarriage
his present wife's community (one-half) interest in his earnings must be deducted before computation of the 40 per cent
payable to Frances, likewise is without merit in view of the
trial court's determination that such a deduction was contrary to the intentions of petitioner and Frances at the time
they executed their contract. [5] Further, such a contract
settling property rights does not constitute an assignment of
"The following portions of the oral opinion rendered by Judge Sweigert
ably summarize much of the evidence which supports his (the trial
court's) decision: "[T]here is no better place to look for enlightenment
than to the conduct of the parties themselves ... [T]he admissions and
the attitude of the defendant hushand in litigation and his acquieseenc.p
for a long period following the executions of the agreement furnish powerful rebuttal of his pres~nt claims. According to the evidence in thp
present case, the defendant IlUsband from the date of the agreement,
May 14th. 1946, to at least March 16th, 1948, the date of his own
remarriage, a period of nearly two years, computed hie Bet income
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and performed the agreement without ever asserting any of the deduction
rights which he now claims ... Now after his remarriage, March 16th,
1!J4S, the ilefendant did eXIloress the opinion that his new wife's commu
nity share of his salary should he excluded and he acted on that view
for several months until addsed to the contrary by . . . the attorney
who had represented both parties in the drafting of the agreement . . .
Ho far as appears no other deduction rights of any kind were ever
asserted or even mcntiollcd until March, 1950, when the defendant con·
~lItted another counsel . . . who confirmed his view regarding the
deduction of the community interest of his wife and who also raised
the point, apparently for the first time, that the defe.ndant was further
entitled to take all ineomp tax deductions . . . . Thereupon the defendant
ceased paympnts on the theory that he already had overpaid the plaintiff.
"It should be noted, however, that the defendant husband himself con·
cedes that his first belief that he could exclude all income tax deduction~
was in March, 1950. That appears in defendant's affidavit . . .
"In April, 1951, the defendant husband consulted other lind addi·
tional counsel who then advised him that all of his obligations under
the eontract had been terminated by the plaintiff's remarriage of
October 21st, 1948. What advice if any was received by him in April.
1951, regarding possible deductions under the contract does not appear.
At any rate, when the action to establish and enforce the Ne"ada decree
was commenced in June, 1951, the complaint alleged that between
January 1st, 1950, and June 15th, 1951, the defendant's net income had
been a given amount. thirty·three thousand some odd dollars. This
allegation was admitted by the defendant in his answer, although the fact
of the matter was that that amount was, in fact, a computation without
regard to any of the deductions now claimed by the defendant. . . .
The sole point raised by the defendant in the Buit was not formula for
net income but the effect of the plaintiff's remaniage upon the contract
obligations of the defendant.
"It is rather difficult for a court to see how a man of considerable
wealth, accustomed to keeping accounts, conscious of tax and other
factors, and ha"ing available at all times the ad"ice of accountants and
counsel of his own choosing, would continue to payout under a contract
substantial amounts over and above that which he himself contemplated
and intended when the contract was made. In these circumstances such
alleged overpayments are not explainable b~' inad"ertence or ignorance;
the only reasonable conclusion is that the defendant husband paid out
exactly what he beJieved and originally intended to be his obligations
under the terms of the contract until he was ad"ised long after the
contract was made that it could be interpreted to mean something
different than his own original intent. But in this situation we go even
further than that. It appears here that after the defendant husband
received express advice concerning a possible interpretation of the con·
tract, even then in a formal lawsuit pending in which his obligations
under the contract were involved, [he] makes a formal admission of
fact which is counter to the interpretation of the contract which he now
claims. For these reasons . . . I have come to the conclusion that even
assuming this contract to be susceptible of the interpretation placed on it
by the plaintiff wife and also susceptible of the interpretation placed
upon it by the defendant husband, and even aSBuming that the contract
is ambiguous in that respect, that the evidence of the conduct and per·
formance of the defendant husband is such that any doubt concerning
the meaning of the contract according to its terms must be resolved in
accordance with the kind of performance which the defendant rendered

)
518

BRADLEY tJ. SUPERIOR COURT

[48 C.2d

[6] Petitioner furthpr contends that to imprison him for
failure to makp payments to Frances under the property
settlement agreement here involved would violate the provisions of the state Constitution forbidding imprisonment for
debt. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.)8 This contention is sound.
In the California action it was specifically and finally determined, as between the parties, that the payments here involved
are •• an inseverable part of an integrated adjustment of all
property relations of the parties and not . . . a severable provision for alimony," and that therefore section 139 of the
Civil Code did not apply so as to terminate, upon the remarriage of Frances, petitioner's obligation to make such payments. (Lane v. Bradley (1954), supra, 124 Cal.App.2d 661,
666-667.) And as already mentioned herein, the property
settlement agreement itself declares that it "is intended . . .
to refer only to property rights. . . ." [7] It is, of course, '
also the rule that a decree is subject to modification if the
payments therein provided are for alimony, maintenance or
support, even though based on a property settlement agreement, but not if, as already determined in this case, they in
themselves are an integral part of an adjustment of property
rights. (CodornU v. Codorniz (1950), 34 Ca1.2d 811, 814
[215 P.2d 32] ; Hough v. Hough (1945),26 Ca1.2d605, 612-615
[160 P.2d 15J.) [8] Or, as declared in Dexter v. Dexter
(1954), 42 Ca1.2d 36, 41-42 [265 P.2d 873], "to the extent
that they [monthly payments] represent a division of the
under it for a considerable period rather than in accordance with his
presently-asserted interpretation of the contract.
UN ow for these reasons I will make a ruling ... that the Nevada decree of June 24th, 1946, as established herein September 26th, 1952.
and the property agreement of May 14th, 1946, approved and made a
part of the decrees, must be interpreted to express an intention of the
parties that the defendant was to pay 40 per cent of his net income .••,
exclnsive of capital gains and losses and distributions out of capital, but
before [the various deductions presently claimed by defendant] . . .
" ••. I have separately considered the question whether or not the
defendant's claim that the half-community interest of his present wife in
his salary should be deductihle under this contract. but I have come to
the conclusion that . . . it wuld not be deducted under any . . . theory
of interpretation of the agreement. It seems to me that agreement waa
negotiated in contemplation of the defendant husband's income at the
time of the separation of the parties. It would be unreasonable to
aSlUlI!e that the parties had in mind but did not mention a non-existent
but possible future event which would suddenly and substantially alter
the factors of the defendant's income . • ."
"·See. 15. No person shall be imprisoned for debt in any civil aetion,
.. mesne or final proce88; 'unless in eases of fraud, nor in civil actionll
for torts, except in eases of wilful injury to person or property; and DO
penon Ihall be imprisoned tor a militia fine in time of peace."

)
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community property itself, or constitute an inseparable part
of the consideration for the property settlement, they are not
alimony, and accordingly cannot be modified without changing
the terms of the property settlement agreement of the parties. "
[9] Neither the court nor the Legislature may impair thc
• obligation of a valid contract (Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 1, 16)
and a court cannot lawfully disregard the provisions of such
contracts or deny to either party his rights thereunder.
(Majors v. Majors (1945), 70 Cal.App.2d 619,627 [10] [161
P.2d 494] ; see also McClure v. McClure (1893), 100 Cal. 339,
343 [34 P. 822] ; Hensley v. Hensley (1918), 179 Cal. 284,
287-288 [183 P. 445] ; M7~ller v. Superior Court (1937),9 Cal.
2d 733, 737 [4] [72 P.2d 868] ; Hill v. Ht1l (1943),23 Cal.2d
82,90 [142 P.2d 417] ; Adams v. Adams (1947),29 Ca1.2d 621,
624 [1] [177 P.2d 265] ; Patton v. Patton (1948), 32 Cal.2d
520, 524 [196 P .2d 909].)
[10] Although," As in the case of all constitutional provisions designed to safeguard the liberties of the person,
every doubt should be resolved in favor of the liberty of the
citizen in the enforcement of the constitutional provision that
no person shall be imprisoned for debt" (11 Am.Jur. 1128,
§ 327; see also id., 670, § 59; 16 C.J.S. 1004, § 204(1)), a court
may nevertheless punish by imprisonment as a contempt the
willful act of a spouse (or former spouse) who, having the
ability and opportunity to comply. deliberately refuses to
obey a valid order to pay alimony or an allowance for the
support of the other spouse (or former other spouse). [11] It
is held that the obligation to make such payments is not a
"debt" within the meaning of the constitutional guaranty
against imprisonment for debt. (M17ler v. Superior Court
(1937), supra, 9 Cal.2d 733, 737 [3]; Ex parte Spencer
(1890), 83 Cal. 460, 465 [23 P. 395, 17 Am.St.Rep 266] ; see
also 11 Am.Jur., 1129-1130.)
[12] Where, however, the payments provided in a property settlement agreement constitute an adjustment of property interests, rather than alimony, support, or maintenance,
the more generally prevailing rule is stated to be that decrees
based thereon are not enforceable by contempt proceedings.
(154 A.L.R. 466, 468-469.) The rule in Washington is "that
the provisions of such [divorce] decrees, as they relate to the
payment of money (as distinguished from alimony or support money for children), cannot be enforced by contempt
proceedings. [Cit8;tions of Washington cases.] As pointed
out in Corrigeux'v. Corrigeux [1950, 37 Wn.2d 403], 224
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P.2d 343, back of these cases is the constitutional prOVISIon
that there can be no imprisonment for debt (state constitution, Art. I, sec. 17), together with holdings by this court
and courts generally that alimony and support money for
children is not a debt within the purview of such constitutional provisions." (Robinson v. Robinson (1950), 37 Wn.
2d 511, 515 [225 P.2d 411,413].) In Maryland it has been held
that only modifiable alimony payments may be enforced by
contempt, and that both child support and unmodifiable payments based on the parties' written agreement (even though
such payments might be characterized as "alimony" in the
court's order in the divorce proceedings) fall within the eonstitutional provision prohibiting imprisonment for debt.
(Bushman v. Bushman (1929), 157 Md. 166 (145 A. 488,
491-492] j Dickey v. Dickey (1928), 154 Md. 675 (141 A. 387,
390, 58 A.L.R. 634].) Further, it appears that in Michigan
"The fact that the court's award, made pursuant to or in accordance with the parties' agreement, includes both alimony
and a property settlement (or a settlement in lieu of dower,
or other obligation not enforceable by contempt proceedings)
commingled in such a way that it does not appear, from the
provisions of the decree, what amount of the award is alimony
and what amount property settlement (or other obligation),
has been deemed to preclude the enforcement of such award
by contempt proceedings." (154 A.L.R. 475.) .
No California case has been cited or discovered in which
the point has been squarely presented and passed on. In
M17ler v. Superior Court (1937), supra, 9 Ca1.2d 733, 737,
enforcement by contempt was allowed of the provisions of a
property settlement agreement providing for the payment of
$75 a month. However, the court there pointed out (p. 739
of 9 Cal.2d) that "The basis of the obligation in the case of
an approval (of a property settlement agreement] and order
to pay, as in the case of an award of allowance not based on
agreement, is the statutory obligation of marital support
which is not a 'debt' within the meaning of the constitutional
provision. We are of the view that the orclrr to nay a monthly
(lUou-oncl', eYen though in accordance with: be n~"eement of the
parties, is not a 'debt' within the meanil1" Gi the constitutional prohibition." (Italics added.) [13]· l'hat is to say,
there may be situations in which the fact that a party has
agreed to pay some fixed or ascertainable amount af; alimony
does not change or .control the character of the obligation
sought to be enforcl!d by the other. Merely adding the con-
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sensual element of agreement to pay support does not obliterate an existing legal duty. [14] In the absence of a waiver
by the contracting spouses (expressly or by necessary implication) of reciprocal rights to support other than as provided
in the agreement, either party may properly seek to enforce
in the divorce proceeding the obligations imposed by law as
incidents of the marriage. But where the parties bargain with each other and agree that the terms of their contract shall thereupon and thenceforth grant, delimit and exclusively define their respective rights and obligations inter Be,
then it is to the contract alone, and to conventional civil proceedings for the enforcement of contract rights, that they
must look for a remedy in the event of breach. [15] Inclusion of such a contract in a judgment of divorce may furnish
a basis for subsequent proceedings leading to issuance of a
writ of execution but cannot support a commitment to imprisonment for failure to pay the judgment debt.
In In re Lazar (1940), 37 Cal.App.2d 327 [99 P.2d 342].
the theory that the payments ordered were analogous to support money was in part relied upon to support enforcement by
contempt of a property settlement agreement carried into the
divorce decree. It may be also noted that that case, citing
Miller v. Superior Court, supra, asserts (p. 331 of 37 Cal.
App.2d) that compliance with an order "directing the settlement of separate property rights, may be enforced by imprisonment," whereas, as already pointed out, the decision
in the Miller case actually rested upon the theory of marital
support. Further, the payments provided by the property
settlement agreement involved in In re Lazar were, some nine
months later, stated by this (Supreme) court to be for alimony, support and maintenance of the wife, rather than as an
adjustment of property rights. (Lazar v. Superior Court
(1940), 16 Cal.2d 617, 621-622 [5] (107 P.2d 249].) The
case of Tripp v. Superior Court (1923), 61 Ca1.App. 64, 67
[214 P. 252], also relied upon in In re Lazar, likewise appears
to turn in part upon the husband '$ obligation to make "proper
provision for the support and maintenance of the wife, provided that it were first ascertained that petitioner was guilty
of the charges made against him in the divorce action."
Moreover, no mention of the constitutional provision is made
in thE' Tripp case, and the holding that the property settlement agreement and divorce decree there involved were enforceable by contempt proceedings was reached without citation of authority; in support thereof.
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[16] It is to be recognized that the term "alimony" does
not contemplate a settlement of property interests or general
endowment of wealth. "Like the alimentum of the civil law,
from which the word was evidently derived, it has for its sole
object the provision of food, clothing, habitation, and other
necessaries for . . . support." (17 Am.Jur. 406, and eases
cited, note 12.) It is to attain that "sole object" that the
law imposes an obligation which is regarded as something
other than a debt and which may be enforced by contempt
proceedings upon appropriate showing. Here the judgment
manifestly purports to sanction a negotiated agreement rather
than an obligation imposed by law.
[17] We are satisfied that the better view is that payments
provided in a property settlement agreement which are found
to constitute an adjustment of property interests, rather than
a severable provision for alimony, should be held to fall
within the constitutional proscription against imprisonment
for debt. That is, if the obligation sought to be enforced is
contractual and negotiated, as distinguished from marital
and imposed by law, even though the contract relates to marriage obligations, the remedy must be appropriate to the
right asserted. [18] Payments which fan into the category
of law-imposed alimony or separate maintenance are based I
upon the statutory obligation of marital support, may be
modified by the court upon a proper showing, ordinarily I
terminate with the death of either party, and may properly
be held not to constitute a ,. debt" within the meaning of the
('onstitutional provision. No such case for special exemption
from the constitutional proscription ('an be made where the
payments represent the result of a bargain negotiated by
the parties in adjustment of their respective interests, and
any implications to the contrary which may be found in the
following cases are disapproved: In re Rasmussen (1922), 56
Cal.App. 368 [205 P. 72] ; Ex Parte Weiler (1930), 106 Cal.
App. 485 [289 P. 645] ; In re Lazar (1940), supra, 37 Cal.
App.2d 327; Seymour v. Seymour (1937), 18 Cal.App.2d
481 [64 P.2d 168] ; Tn'pp v. Superior Court (1923), supra,
61 Ca1.App. 64; Shogren v. Superior Court (1949), 93 Cal.
App.2d 356, 364 [209 P.2d 108].
[19] Inasmuch as it has been finally determined, as between these parties, that the payments to be made by petitioner to Frances in the present case constitute "an inseverable part of an integrated adjustment of all property relations of the partieS and not ... a severable provision for
I
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alimony" (Lane v. Bradley (1954), supra, 124 Cal.App.2d
661, 666-667), we conclude that enforcement of such payments by contempt proceedings is forbidden by the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt. This conI'lusion makes unnecessary a discussion of other attacks made
by petitioner upon the contempt order.
For the reasons above stated, the order holding petitioner
in contempt is annulled.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I concur in the judgment annulling the contempt order and I agree generally with the views expressed in
the majority opinion, but since certain decisions of this court
(Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Ca1.2d 36 [265 P.2d 873] ; Messenger v.
Messenger,46 Cal.2d 619 [297 P.2d 988]) with which I do not
agree are cited and relied upon in the majority opinion,' I
feel constrained to withhold my unqualified concurrence
therefrom.
In the recent case of Herda v. Herda decided by this court
on March 22, 1957, I took occasion in a concurring and dissenting opinion to call attention to the great confusion which
now exists in this field of law due to irreconcilable conflicts
in the decisions of this court and the appel1ate courts of this
stat.e. Since the main issue in the case at bar involves the
interpretation and application of article I, section 15. of the
Constitution of California there is no need for further discussion relating to this conflict.
TRA YNOR, J .-1 dissent.
The majority opinion concedes that an alimony award
based on the agreement of the parties is enforcible by contempt (see also Holloway v. Holloway. 130 Ohio St. 214 [198
N.E. 579, 154 A.L.R. 439] ; 154 A.L.R. 449) since it is sufficiently related to the statutory duty of support incident to
the marriage relationship as to be outside the constitutional
prohibition of imprisonment for debt. (Cal. Const., art I.
§ 15.) Rights and duties with respect to property growing
out of tIle marriage relationship and crystallized in a court
order are likewise outside the scope of that provision. Snch
an order has not less a special charartrr breanse it is based
Oil an agreement of .the parties than an alimony award based
on sueh an agre('ment. Indeed, in some states the very theory
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underlying use of contempt to enforce awards of alimony
is that alimony is itself an adjustment of property rights.
(Lyon v. Lyon, 21 Conn. 185, 196-197; State v. Cook, 66
Ohio St. 566 [64 N.E. 567, 568, 58 L.R.A. 625]; West v.
West, 126 Va. 696 [101 S.E. 876, 877].)
\
Tripp v. Superior Court, 61 Cal.App. 64 [214 P. 252], i
Petry v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.App.2d 756 [116 P.2d 954], I
and Seymour v. Seymour, 18 Cal.App.2d 481 [64 P.2d 168],
upheld the use of contempt to enforce orders pursuant to
property settlements even though they were not in lieu of
the statutory duty of support. (See also Sullivan v. Superior
Court, 72 Cal.App. 531, 535 [237 P. 782] ; Ex parte Weiler,
106 Cal.App. 485, 488 [289 P. 645]; Shogren v. Superior
Court, 93 Cal.App.2d 356, 364 [209 P.2d 108]; Young v.
Superior Court, 105 Cal.App.2d 65, 67 [233 P.2d 39].) Although the court stressed the duty of support as a basis for
contempt in MiUer v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.2d 733 [72 P.2d
868], it cited with approval the Seymour and Tripp cases and
expressly refused to follow the Maryland cases (Dickey v.
Dickey, 154 Md. 675 [141 A. 387] j Bushman v. Bushman,
157 Md. 166 [145 A. 488]), now invoked by the majority
opinion.
Even if the statutory duty of support were the sole justification for enforcing such court orders by contempt, the majority opinion would still be in error in stating that an order
to make payments pursuant to an integrated bargain cannot
be so enforced, when the wife has not remarried. In Dexter
v. Dexter, 42 Cal.2d 36, 41-42 [265 P.2d 873], we stated:
"When, as in this case . . . , the parties have made the provision for support and maintenance an intel!ral part of their
property settlement agreement, the monthly payments will
ordinarily have a dual character. To the extent that they
are designed to discharge the obligation of support and
maintenance they will ordinarily reflect the charaeterist.ics of
that. obligat.ion and thus have the indicia of alimony. [Citations.) On the other hand, to the extent that they represent
a division of the community property itself, or constitute an
inseparable part of the consideration for the property settlement, they arc not alimony, and accordingly cannot be modified
without changing the terms of the property settlement agreement of the parties." So long' as thE' wifr has not remarried,
the characteristics of the support and maintE'llanre ob] igation
remain and alone justif~r enforcrnwnt by contrmpt. Surh a
rule is implicit in ,the Miller case, where the court took care
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to point out that the payments were pursuant to a property
settlement and eould not be changed without the consent of
the parties. (9 Ca1.2d at 740 [see also, concurring and dissenting opinion of Carter, J. in Dexter v. Dexter, 42 Ca1.2d
36,45 [265 P.2d 873J : "The rule in such a case should be that
if the entire agreement is approved by the court and part of its
provisions are incorporated in the decree and order to be performed, those portions included in the decree may be enforced
by contempt proceedings."].)
Even if the obligation to make the payments pursuant to
the order of the court did constitute a debt within the meaning of the constitutional provision, the obligor's wilful refusal to make them when he is able to do so would be a "case
of fraud" within the meaning of the exception in that pro"ision. In sustaining the validity of a criminal statute dealing with nonpayment of wages this court stated: "The his- . :
torical background of section 15 of article I and similar eonstitutional guaranties of other states clearly shows that the
pro"isions were adopted to protect the poor but honest debtor
who is unable to pay his debts, and were not intended to
shield a dishonest man who takes an unconscionable advantage
of another. [Citations.] It has long been recognized that
wages are not ordinary debts, that they may be preferred over
other claims, and that, because of the economic position of the
average worker and, in particular, his dependence on wages
for the necessities of life for himself and his family, it is
('ssential to the public welfare that he receive his pay when
it is due. [Citations.] An employer who knows that wages
are due, has the ability to pay them, and still refuses to pay
them, acts against good morals and fair dealing, and necessarily intentionally does an act which prejudices the rights
of his employee. Such conduct amounts to a 'case of fraud'
within the meaning of the exception to the constitutional prohibition and may be punished by statute." (In re Trombley,
31 Cal.2d 801, 809-810 [193 P.2d 734]; see also Ex parte
Grace, ]2 Iowa 208, 213 [79 Am.Dec. 529] ; Ex parte Olark,
20 N.J.L. 648, 650-651 [45 Am.Dec. 394].)
"\Vhether or not the reasoning of the Trombley case would
apply to any wilful refusal to pay a debt when the obligor is
able to pay, it clearly applies to obligations arising out of
property settlement agreements irrespective of whether the
Jlayments are solely alimony. "Property settlement ,agreements occupy a fayored position in the law of this state and
are sanctioned, by the Civil Code." (Adams v. Adams, 29
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Ca1.2d 621, 624 [177 P.2d 265], and cases cited.) There may
be practical considerations for an order that community prop
erty, such as a going business, remain intact and that the wife
receive her share in periodic payments. Whether such payments are also intended to discharge a duty of support, they
may actually be the wife's only means of support. As in
the case of wages, the payments may be difficult to collect by
repeated executions. The enforcement of the obligation by
contempt is no more tantamount to imprisonment for debt
than criminal punishment for the wilful refusal to pay wages.
I would adhere to the settled law of this state and affirm
the order holding petitioner in contempt.
The petition of the real party in interest for a rehearing
was denied June 5, 1957. Traynor, J. t was of the opinion
that the petition should be granted.

)

